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Abstract 
As we endow cognitive robots with ever more human-like 
capacities, these have begun to resemble constituent aspects of the 
‘self’ in humans (e.g., putative psychological constructs such as a 
narrative self, social self, somatic self and experiential self). 
Robot’s capacity for body-mapping and social learning in turn 
facilitate skill acquisition and development, extending cognitive 
architectures to include temporal horizon by using 
autobiographical memory (own experience) and inter-personal 
space by mapping the observations and predictions on the 
experience of others (biographic reconstruction). This ‘self-
projection’ into the past and future as well as other’s mind can 
facilitate scaffolded development, social interaction and planning 
in humanoid robots.   
  This temporally extended horizon and social capacities newly 
and increasingly available to cognitive roboticists have analogues 
in the function of the Default Mode Network (DMN) known from 
human neuroscience, activity of which is associated with self-
referencing, including discursive narrative processes about present 
moment experience, ‘self-projection’ into past memories or future 
intentions, as well as the minds of others. Hyperactivity and 
overconnectivity of the DMN, as well as its co-activation with the 
brain networks related to affective and bodily states have been 
observed in different psychopathologies. Mindfulness practice, 
which entails reduction in narrative self-referential processing, has 
been shown to result in an attenuation of the DMN activity and its 
decoupling from other brain networks, resulting in more efficient 
brain dynamics, and associated gains in cognitive function and 
well-being. This suggests that there is a vast space of possibilities 
for orchestrating self-related processes in humanoids together with 
other cognitive activity, some less desirable or efficient than 
others. Just as for humans, relying on emergence and self-
organization in humanoid scaffolded cognitive development might 
not always lead to the ‘healthiest’ and most efficient modes of 
cognitive dynamics. Rather, transient activations of self-related 
processes and their interplay dependent on and appropriate to the 
functional context may be better suited for the structuring of 
adaptive robot cognition and behaviour.  
Introduction 
 
Efforts in Artificial Intelligence in particular and, most 
promisingly, AI Cognitive Robotics seek to produce life-like 
agents by emulating the capacities seen in nature, particularly 
in humans (Mori, 1989; Brooks, 1986; Brooks et al., 1998; 
Nehaniv et al. 2013; Cangelosi and Schlesinger, 2015).1 
Various aspects of the ‘self’ have been introduced in synthetic 
agents and robots in the hope of achieving human-like 
intelligence and capabilities through building with 
constructive methods (e.g. Brooks et al., 1998; Nehaniv et al., 
1999).  
   By endowing simple behaviour-based robots (Brooks, 
1986) with extended temporal horizon (Nehaniv, 1999; 
Nehaniv et al. 2002) 2  and second-person capacities 
(Dautenhahn, 1997)3, cognitive architectures of increasing 
                                                             
1 This paper introduces and extends the ideas of Antonova and Nehaniv 
(2012).   
2  For example, harnessing autobiographical remembering of own 
sensorimotor and other ‘experience’ (operationally this can be taken as 
sensorimotor flow over an extended window of time) supports learning, 
prospection and expectation based on this are type of ‘proto-narrative’ 
available to robots that does not involve language. Moreover, such proto-
narratives can be shared and communicated or inferred about other agents 
(biographic reconstruction, generalized ‘story-telling’ and narrative) to 
give robots the capacity to learn from and project their own and others’ 
temporally extended experience into useful ‘stories’ or ‘plans’. 
3  Concepts in social robotics of empathic resonance involving 
recognition of another agent as having a somehow similar embodiment 
and ‘experience’ to one’s own and biographic reconstruction as 
recognition of the temporally extended experience of another agent are 
‘second person’ mechanisms of immediate and broad temporal horizon, 
complementing other second person mechanisms such as mutual and joint 
attention, body mapping in imitation and social learning. 
 
sophistication for grounded embodied cognitive development 
are now deployed on humanoids. Scaffolded development 
(Broz et al., 2012, 2016; Saunders et al. 2012, Foerster et al., 
2017) and prospection (Mirza et al., 2008b) have become 
possible in humanoids capable of social learning of 
behaviours and skills in interaction with others. This can be 
achieved by harnessing autobiographical remembering (1st 
person) and mapping (2nd person) of the robot’s own 
temporally extended experience to that of others (humans or 
robots), without building-in representational capacity (an 
aspect of intelligence to be explained, not pre-supposed). 
Adaptable body-mapping and body-schemas for control, self-
repair, imitation and social learning (Alissandrakis et al., 
2007a,b; Bongard et al., 2010) in addition to enhanced 
sensorimotor flows, with robot ‘experience’ and action 
modulated by ‘affect’ are now part of the toolkit of cognitive 
developmental systems researchers. Such capabilities are 
rudiments of narrative, social, somatic and experiential 
‘selves’. 
   Here we relate aspects of self-related processes as 
conceived in philosophy, artificial intelligence robotics and 
neuroscience toward a deeper understanding of the space of 
possibilities for how dynamic self-related processes could 
interplay or possibly interfere in humanoid robots. 
 
Aspects of Self in Western Philosophy 
 
Human experience is commonly structured by an aspect of a 
separate ‘self’ that exists independently from its environment. 
Ever since William James, there is a tradition of treating ‘self’ 
as a permanent feature underlying otherwise constantly 
changing experience. Numerous distinctions have been made 
in an attempt to capture aspects of self-experience (e.g. James, 
1890, Neisser,1988; Strawson, 1999, Gallagher 2000, 2013). 
Recurring aspects include (but are not limited to) narrative 
self, social self, somatic self, and experiential self.  These 
'self'-related processes, arising in ontogeny, serve diverse and 
useful functions in humans. Their dynamic interplay and 
flexibility in shifting from one to another in a context-
dependent manner is essential for adaptive (healthy) 
behaviour and cognition.  
   Gallagher (2000) proposed that various approaches to 
characterizing self-related processes can be divided into two 
main groups: the minimal self and the narrative self. The 
minimal self captures immediate momentary 
phenomenological subject of experience and contains, to 
various degrees, a sense of agency and ownership. The 
narrative self (Neisser’s ‘extended self’) captures the sense of 
personal identity extended in time, constituted by the stories 
of the past and intentions for the future that we tell ourselves 
and others. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
but it is questioned to what extent it is possible to have a 
minimal self experience without a narrative one.  
   The minimal self experience can be constituted by an 
interplay of perceptual, somatic (bodily and homeostatic 
states), affective, and social (inter-personal) aspects of the 
present-moment experience in various degrees depending on 
the context.  The narrative self in most part is supported by 
the episodic (autobiographical) memory processes. Both 
aspects of self are maintained by the process of ‘self-
referencing’, i.e. identifying with the experience as ‘I’ 
(experiencing subject) or ‘me, mine’ (experiencing object). 
This in turn necessitates involvement of a conceptual (and 
perhaps language-based semantic) framework to structure 
one’s experience.    
Aspects of Self in Artificial Intelligence and 
Robotics 
Self in Enactivist AI Approaches 
 
Enactivist viewpoints reject the necessity of an extended 
‘narrative’ self to structure the experience (Varela et al., 
1991). They also posit the possibility of non-conceptual first-
person experience that emerges from the dynamic embodied 
interactions with the environment and constituted by various 
intertwined, dependently co-originated transitory component 
processes. On this account, ‘self’ as an experience comes into 
existence when the relationship between top-down predictive 
processes and the bottom-up sensory-motor processes come 
into conflict. This self is not an entity extended over time, but 
a short-term emergent phenomenal experience brought about 
by self-reference (Tani, 1998). 
   Despite the fact that present day robots are not autopoietic 
(self-producing) entities, dynamical systems and evolutionary 
methods have been applied to analyse the robotic second-
person ‘experience’ where action and agent-environmental 
coupling is given meaning for agents through Darwinian 
evolution (Iizuka and Ikegami, 2004; Froese and Di Paolo, 
2011; Froese and Gallagher, 2012; Nehaniv, in press).  
    Interaction games for robots and human agents are 
analogous to Wittgenstein’s language games where meaning 
is grounded by usage in recurring contexts (Nehaniv et al., 
1999).  The dynamics and information flow cut across the 
agent-environment distinctions, and a key success criterion 
comprises felicitous interaction in engagement with naïve 
human participants (Nehaniv et al. 2013; Foerster et al. 2017).  
Enactive approaches scaffolded on social learning in recurring 
interaction games have in this manner demonstrated the 
acquisition of meaningful behaviours and grounded language  
usage by humanoids based on ‘operationalized experience’ 
(sensorimotor-affective interaction histories / autobiographical 
traces) and social engagement without any explicit built-in 
system for representational semantics or reference (Mirza et 
al., 2005, 2008; Saunders et al., 2012; Broz et al., 2012; 
Foerster et al., 2017).   
 
Emulating Human Features 
 
Very often the motivation is to maximally emulate humans as 
much as possible in every aspect to achieve the holy grail of 
'true AI' or human-like intelligence by capturing every aspect 
of a human in a robot, humanoid, or ‘geminoid’ (Ikegami and 
Ishiguro, 2017). 
  
Figure 1: The iCub Humanoid DeeChee, a robotic platform at the 
University of Hertfordshire for embodied cognitive systems research. 
Cognitive architectures supporting mechanisms closely related to self 
processes support the humanoid’s developmental scaffolding, social 
learning, experiential autobiographical memory and interaction 
histories in embodied interaction games for bottom-up skill- and 
language-acquisition in interaction with human participants (e.g., 
Mirza et al. 2008a; Saunders et al. 2012; Broz et al. 2012; Nehaniv et 
al. 2013; Foerster et al. 2017).  
 
 Thus many cognitive architectures and extensions to 
existing computational architectures in agents and robots seek 
to achieve a more human-like intelligence by implementing a 
particular aspect of the ‘self’. Increasingly, AI robotics 
designers are finding they need to include aspects of somatic 
self by introducing adaptive somatic body self-models 
(Bongard et al., 2006) and  multisensory ego-sphere saliency 
(Ruesch et al., 2008); narrative self, including 
autobiographical, episodic and narrative memory  processes 
(Nehaniv, 1999; Ho et al., 2004, 2006, 2008; Nehaniv et al., 
2013; Pointeau et al., 2014; Pointeau and Dominey, 2017), 
and first-person remembering and interaction histories (Mirza 
et al. 2006, 2008a; Broz et al., 2012); social self by mapping 
to the 2nd person (imitation and social learning (Nehaniv and 
Dautenhahn, 2002), narratives about self/others and story-
telling (Ho et al., 2004, 2008), as well as pioneering work on 
theory of other minds (Barnden, 2005) or perspective taking 
(Steels and Loetsch, 2009).  
   AI researchers also have sought to harness or model other 
aspects of self-related processes in robots and agents, e.g. 
'self-awareness' (Tani 19984, Tani 2017), or ‘consciousness’ 
as a global workspace with which functional modules interact 
(Ramamurthy et al. 2012; Franklin et al. 2016), and mental 
simulation capacity (Lallee and Dominey 2013; Schillaci, 
Hafner, and Lara, 2016), among many others that cannot be 
exhaustively treated in this short article. 
 
Faith in Emergence 
 
These endeavours generally attempt to introduce some single 
aspect of self, whilst ignoring the others.  The general trend 
is to add on new modules in an ad hoc way.  By accreting 
more and more human-like modules and add-ons, it is hoped 
that all the ingredients for human-like cognition will 
eventually give rise to human-like intelligence (Brooks et al., 
1998). 
   Of course, on reflection, most AI robotics researchers now 
realize that there will be interaction effects between modules 
and would usually know enough to expect that, and, from the 
viewpoint of bottom-up emergence, might even want to 
harness positive 'synergies' and new capabilities that might 
arise from these interactions.  Indeed, it is has long been 
envisioned that human-like cognition could emerge somehow 
through their synergetic interactions (Minsky 1988). For 
example, J. K. O’Regan (2011), drawing on ideas of Hume 
and Dennett and trends in cognitive robotics (Brooks et al., 
1998; Edsinger and Kemp, 2006), suggests that by 
implementing in a robot all the necessary capacities for a 
“cognitive self (self-cognizance, self-knowledge, knowledge 
of self-knowledge)”5 and for a “societal self” as a construct 
‘center of narrative gravity’ (Dennett 1991), it is possible to 
see the outlines of how “to build a robot with a self”.  
   However, the details of how such emergence from a 
bundle of processes, modules and ‘agents’ might work, or be 
appropriately orchestrated, have not been mapped out. There 
are vast open spaces of possibilities in this topic of enquiry.  
                                                             
4 J. Tani (1998) writes “structure of the ‘self’ corresponds to the ‘open 
dynamic structure’ which is characterized by co-existence of stability in 
terms of goal-directedness and instability caused by embodiment; (2) the 
open dynamic structure causes the system's spontaneous transition to the 
unsteady phase where the ‘self’ becomes aware. 
5 These terms are O’Regan’s renaming of Bekoff and Sherman (2004)’s 
terms for aspects of self-cognizance (‘self-referencing’, ‘self-awareness’ 
and ‘self-consciousness’, respectively) which they consider in the context 
of evolutionary continuity of animals and humans following (Darwin, 
1871; Griffin, 1976). 
Scaffolded Development 
  
   More recently, cognitive development in long-term 
embodied interaction, based on such interconnected 
architectural components, is envisioned to arise in the course 
of the mutually scaffolded boot-strapping of skills (including 
language ability) in a developing humanoid (Mirza et al., 
2006, 2008a; Vernon et al., 2007; Vernon, 2010; Cangelosi et 
al., 2010; Broz et al., 2012; Nehaniv et al. 2013; Broz et al., 
2014; Pointeau et al., 2014; Cangelosi and Schlesinger, 2015; 
Lyon et al., 2017). Figure 1 shows the humanoid DeeChee in 
which various cognitive architectures for scaffolded 
development and AI processes are tested and interwoven. This 
is seen as paralleling the cognitive development of children 
(Vygotsky, 1978; Kaye, 1982), and closely linked to the 
development of autobiographical memory, narrative 
intelligence, temporal grounding for narrative processes based 
on temporally extended episodic experience, and the 
acquisition of increasingly complex skills and behaviours 
(Mirza et al., 2006, 2008a; Broz et al., 2012), up to 
rudimentary referential and non-referential language such as 
use of negation (Saunders et al., 2012; Foerster et al., 2017).  
Self-related Processes in Neuroscience 
The description and interactions of the neural networks 
associated with the experience of the minimal self are highly 
complex, as are the interrelations between the minimal and the 
narrative self-processes with many unknowns. It is therefore 
beyond the scope of the present paper to survey the field 
comprehensively. In what follows, we discuss the main 
developments in cognitive, clinical and contemplative 
neurosciences in relation to the network associated with the 
narrative self and its interactions with other networks. 
   With the introduction of the neuroimaging methodology, 
such as the functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), 
the modular paradigm, which approached brain areas as 
independent processors for specific higher cognitive functions 
based on neurological lesion findings was superseded by the 
view that cognition is associated with a dynamic interplay 
between distributed brain areas operating in large-scale 
networks (review, Bressler and Menon, 2010). In the light of 
this development, neuroscientists and neurophilosophers have 
drawn parallels with Buddhism and its notion of ‘no-self’, 
with  an experience of ‘self’ as separate independently 
existing entity being a useful illusion emerging through 
evolution (e.g. Metzinger, 2009). 
 
The Default Mode Network and Self-referencing 
 
With the description of what has become known as the 
Default Mode Network, we have a large-scale neural network 
whose activity and interactions with other brain networks 
appears to be associated with the experience of such a 
separate ‘self’. A little discourse into the history of cognitive 
research using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI) is needed here. In the first instance of employing 
fMRI, cognitive neuroscientists were mainly interested in 
studying neural dynamics associated with higher cognitive 
functions by giving participants cognitive tasks requiring 
attention to external stimuli. These were contrasted with either 
control tasks or a so-called ‘resting state’, with either eyes 
closed or looking at a fixation cross. However, what happens 
in the brain during the so-called ‘rest’ was largely ignored. 
Until Gusnard and Raichle (2001) published a review of 
Positron Emission Topography (PET) research in which they 
have addressed directly the ‘mysterious’ task-independent 
decreases in specific areas of the brain during the resting state 
baseline, whether with a simple visual fixation or with eyes 
closed.  The same task-independent decreases, 
predominantly in the midline structures, including medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior cingulate (PC), were 
being consistently observed with fMRI when the resting state 
was used as a comparison baseline to a task of interest. The 
task-independence is the key here; that is, no matter the nature 
of the cognitive task, these areas were active in the absence of 
a task. Furthermore, as the attentional demand of the task is 
increased, the activity in the resting state regions is further 
decreased. This task-independent network was named the 
Default Mode Network (DMN) by Raichle and colleagues, 
since it is activated by default when we are not engaged in a 
goal-directed cognitive activity. It was further shown that not 
only the activity of the midline-based DMN is anti-correlated 
with laterally-distributed task-related networks during 
cognitive tasks, but the activity between these lateral and 
midline networks is constantly shifting and fluxing during 
‘rest’, oscillating at a low frequency of about 0.1 Hz (Fox et 
al., 2005).    
Raichle’s initial intuition was that the DMN activity must 
be associated with spontaneous mentation, day-dreaming, 
mind-wandering, or in general terms ‘self-referencing’, 
quoting Seneca’s “The fact that the body is lying down is no 
reason for supposing that the mind is at peace. Rest is… far 
from restful”.  
However, after this initial intuition Raichle and his 
colleagues have abandoned it, although they have still allowed 
for some of the DMN activity to be accounted for by 
spontaneous self-referential thinking. The primary reason, as 
argued by Raichle (2006), is that in the awake resting state, 
the brain accounts for 20% of the total oxygen consumption of 
the body, whilst the changes in brain activity associated with 
cognitive tasks amount to about 5% increase from the baseline 
activity. If this is the metabolic ‘cost’ of the effortful cognitive 
activity, the unconstrained spontaneous thinking, which is 
effortless, is unlikely to account for the brain’s metabolic 
‘hunger’ at rest.  
However, other lines of research have confirmed the 
association of the DMN activity with  self-referencing in 
general and narrative self-referencing in particular. A meta-
analysis of the fMRI studies examining remembering, 
prospection and the theory of mind (Buckner and Carroll, 
2007) has implicated the DMN as common network 
associated with ‘self-projection’, whether into the past 
memories, future scenarios, or another person’s mind. The 
DMN activity has also been shown to be associated with a 
stimulus-independent thought, i.e. mind-wandering away from 
a cognitive task (e.g. Mason et al., 2007). Studies that have 
directly contrasted conditions requiring deliberate narrative 
self-referential processing with a neutral resting state whilst 
fixating on a cross confirmed the DMN involvement in both 
conditions, with the DMN activity being stronger and more 
wide-spread during the explicitly instructed narrative self-
referential activity (e.g. Davey et al., 2016). Thus, the DMN 
recruitment is consistently observed during internally oriented 
cognition that engages narrative self-processes, whether 
spontaneous or deliberate, goal-directed.  
 
The DMN and Psychopathology 
 
The aberrations in the DMN function have been implicated in 
psychopathology. The DMN hyperactivity and over-
connectivity has been observed in schizophrenia, depression 
(review, Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009), ADHD (Liddle et al., 
2011), autism (Kennedy et al., 2006). Siblings and parents of 
schizophrenia patients show reduced cognitive ability, but no 
difficulties in inhibiting the DMN during cognitive tasks, 
whereas patients appear to be unable to do so (Whitfield-
Gabrieli et al., 2010). In depression, there is an increased 
connectivity between the regions of the DMN and the 
subgenual anterior cingulate (e.g. Berman et al., 2011; 2014), 
a region that plays an important role in modulating autonomic 
and visceral responses during the processing of sadness, fear, 
and stress. Functional connectivity between the DMN and the 
subgenual anterior cingulate has been shown to positively 
correlate with the duration of the current depressive episode 
(Greicius et al., 2007) and self-reported tendencies toward 
rumination and brooding (Berman et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
functional connectivity between the posterior cingulate and 
the subgenual anteriror cingulate significantly increases when 
individuals think about negative events in their life, compared 
with unconstrained rest (Berman et al., 2014). Considering 
what is known about the phenomenology of schizophrenia 
(specifically paranoid sub-type) and depression, these findings 
further confirm the association of the DMN activity with the 
experience of a separate ‘self’, which is under attack either 
from an external source (paranoia) or an internal critic (self-
focused rumination).  
 
The DMN and Contemplative Neuroscience 
 
A further line of evidence comes from the contemplative 
neuroscience. A study of experienced meditators (Hasenkamp 
et al., 2010) who were asked to focus on the breath and press a 
button whenever they noticed their mind has wandered found 
that the episodes of mind-wandering were associated with the 
increased activation of the DMN. This demonstrates that the 
DMN activity is not simply associated with an internally 
focused attention, but instances of narrative self-referential 
thought.  Farb and colleagues (2007) have directly compared 
narrative and experiential (minimal) self-referencing in 
healthy participants and individuals who have undergone 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MSBR), an 8-week 
intensive mindfulness skill training programme based on 
Buddhist contemplative practices (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). In both 
groups, the narrative self-referencing condition was associated 
with the DMN activation. The experiential condition yielded 
focal reductions in the mPFC activity in controls, whereas 
MBSR participants showed more marked and pervasive 
reductions of the same DMN region. Furthermore, functional 
connectivity analyses demonstrated a strong coupling 
between the right insula (area associated with the visceral 
awareness, a part of embodied self-processing) and the mPFC 
in controls that was uncoupled in the mindfulness group. 
These results demonstrate that during an experiential mode of 
processing when narrative self-referencing is suspended there 
is a fundamental dissociation in neural dynamics associated 
with two distinct forms of self-awareness: the ‘self’ across 
time and the present moment experience (the ‘narrative self’ 
and the ‘minimal self’ of Gallagher, 2000). The ability to 
suspend narrative self-processes associated with the activity of 
the DMN and engage experiential ones are enhanced by 
mindfulness practice. This, in part, appears to underpin brain’s 
increased efficiency of the information processing (e.g. 
Pagnoni et al., 2008), relapse prevention in depression (e.g. 
Barnhofer et al., 2015) and general well-being associated with 
mindfulness (e.g. Holzel et al., 2011).  
Balanced Interplay of Self-related Processes 
However, it is not all or none when it comes to the DMN 
activity in humans. Narrative processes related to the 
formation of episodic and autobiographical memories and 
their employment in a functionally relevant context are of 
clear importance for coherent cognitive function and 
interaction.  Thus, diminished DMN functional connectivity 
is observed in healthy aging and is associated with age-related 
cognitive decline (e.g. Vidal-Pineiro et al., 2014). The 
disruptions in the DMN connectivity with the medial temporal 
lobe structures, including hippocampus and parahippocampal 
gyrus associated with episodic memory formation, is a 
hallmark of the Alzheimer’s Disease (e.g. Wu et al., 2011).  
 Hence, it is about a balanced dynamic functionally-relevant 
DMN activation and its co-activation with other networks in a 
context-dependent manner.  As argued by Brewer et al. 
(2013) and demonstrated using fMRI neurofeedback in 
conjunction with subjective reports, the DMN’s sustained 
activity, and particularly that of the PC region, when 
processing self-related content (e.g. sensations, memories, 
emotions, thoughts) may represent “getting caught up in” 
one’s experiences rather than narrative self-referential 
processes per se.  We are all familiar with what that ‘feels 
like’ in a human; it remains to be seen what it might look like 
in a humanoid robot.6 According to Buddhist psychology as 
well as Varela’s enactivist approach for AI robotics, this 
‘sticky’ narrative self-referencing is not functionally 
necessary and can indeed be detrimental.   
Summary and Conclusion 
 
The balance of cognitive resources in performing tasks can be 
influenced by the dynamic interplay of self-related processes, 
the example being a decoupling of narrative self and minimal 
                                                             
6 We stay open on a possibility of phenomenal experience in a robot and 
leave the debate on the issue of phenomenal experience per se out of this 
paper. We stand with Varela (1996) on the primacy of phenomenal 
experience in humans and advocate his remedy for ‘the hard problem of 
consciousness’ (see Bitbol and Antonova (2016) for detailed explication 
of the view). 
self that could be enhanced by mindfulness training. In the 
light of this, it seems that careful assessment is needed in 
determining what types of self-related processes an enactive 
cognitive robot should embody and whether some modes of 
their operation and interaction might reduce rather than 
increase functional and 'metabolic' efficiency, as well as 
effective inter-personal interactions and interactions with the 
environment.  
   The discussion here has highlighted the DMN’s 
association with an experience of a narrative self, its 
implication in psychopathologies, and its interaction with 
other brain networks for healthy cognitive function. Similar 
interdependencies between self-related processes might also 
affect the optimal functioning of humanoid minds. Complex 
unforeseen interaction effects may arise between self-related 
processes in humanoids, including somatic, social and 
narrative self-processes, or other modules or mechanisms 
added to humanoid robots to make them more human-like in 
an effort to maximally emulate all aspects of human beings. 
   In conclusion, in humans and hence, for similar reasons, 
in future cognitive robots, 'self' is best conceived of as an 
interplay of transitory processes arising in a context-
dependent and a function-specific manner. 'Self' as a 
continuously running process (either as a module or a 
distributed network) 'overseeing' the job of other processes in 
a top-down manner could be functionally inefficient and even 
detrimental. Finally, given the findings of the clinical 
neuroscience in relation to the functional alterations of the 
DMN, as well as contemplative neuroscience showing that 
brain processing dynamics may be enhanced when the 
narrative self-processes are suspended, caution must be 
entertained when modelling the narrative self-processes and 
their relative dominance within the overall interplay of self-
related dynamics.   
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